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A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese 
Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason 
(Viruddhāvyabhicārin)1 
Shinya Moriyama 
Introduction: Viruddhāvyabhicārin in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti 
As is well known, the tradition of Chinese Buddhist logic, that is, the 
study of logical reasons (hetuvidyā, Chin. yinming, Jap. immyō 因明), 
started with the translations by Xuanzang (玄奘 , 600/602–664) of 
Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha (=NM, Yinming zhengli men lun 因明正理門論, 
T1628) and Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśa[ka] (=NP, Yinming ru zhengli lun 
因明入正理論, T1630).2 While a number of Xuanzang’s pupils then 
wrote commentaries on these two texts, it was the commentary by Kuiji 
(窺基, 632–682) on the NP that had the greatest impact on the later deve-
lopment of the Chinese and Japanese hetuvidyā.3 This commentary con-
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 I am grateful to Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe, Prof. Shōryū Katsura, Prof. Tōru Funayama, 
and Prof. Eli Franco for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am 
also indebted to Dr. Michael Radich, who made insightful comments and suggestions on 
the final draft. I also thank Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting my English. 
2 Inami (2012: 22-23) has pointed out that the title of this work is still uncertain: accord-
ing to the Tibetan and Chinese traditions it is called Nyāyapraveśa, whereas according to 
Jain tradition it is called Nyāyapraveśaka.  
3 With regard to Xuanzang’s intentions in translating these two works, Takemura (1986: 
31) assumes that it was for the purpose of educating his pupils who were engaged in 
translation work, especially those translating volumes 15 and 38 of the Yogācārabhūmi, 
in which several logical issues are discussed. To train them in questions of logic, Xuan-
zang selected NM and NP as two introductions to Indian logic. In the process of working 
on these translations, some of his pupils (Shentai 神泰, Jingmai 靖邁, Mingjue 明覚, 
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tains several interesting topics, on which Kuiji provided his own inter-
pretations of logical terms and argumentations, including the topic of 
the so-called antinomic reason (viruddhāvyabhicārin). The antinomic rea-
son is one of the fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) that fail to establish the 
intended thesis. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the originality 
of Kuiji’s interpretation when compared to various interpretations by 
Indian commentators on the NP. 
Before undertaking this comparison, however, we shall start with a 
brief overview of the historical development of the interpretations of 
this fallacious reason in Indian Buddhism (see Ui, 1966: 227-230; Kitaga-
wa, 1965: 192-199; Tani 1987; Tillemans, 2000: 92-95; Ueda, 2008; and Ono, 
2010). Dignāga, considered the founder of Buddhist logic, classifies the 
fallacious reason called “antinomic” (viruddhāvyabhicārin) as an “incon-
clusive” reason (anaikāntika). It takes a unique position, however, within 
the group of “inconclusive” reasons: whereas the inconclusive nature of 
the others is based on their not fulfilling the three characteristics of a 
valid logical reason (trairūpya, 因三相), the antinomic reason does fulfill 
the three characteristics. Why, then, is it considered an “inconclusive” 
reason? In response to this question, Dignāga states the following: 
PSVK (ad PS 3.23b, Kitagawa, 1965: 495): gang gi phyir bshad pa’i mtshan 
nyid can gyi ’gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthong ste | dper na 
byas pa dang mnyan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa dang mi rtag pa dag 
nyid la the tshom za ba bzhin no.4 
= Ono, 2010: 127, fn. 4: yasmād uktalakṣaṇābhyāṃ viruddhābhyām ekas-
min saṃśayo dṛṣṭaḥ, tad yathā kṛtakatvaśrāvaṇatvābhyāṃ śabde nityānit-
yatvena saṃśayaḥ.  
Because doubt is observed in respect to the same subject on account 
of two contradictory [reasons], both fulfilling the above-stated [triple] 
characteristics of [a valid logical reason], for instance, one might 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Wenbei 文備, Wengui 文軌, Bigong 壁公, etc.) developed a great deal of interest in 
this new field and began to write their own commentaries on these two works.  
4 See PSVV (ad PS 3.23b, Kitagawa, 1965: 495): gal te gang phyir ’gal ba mtshan nyid gnyis su 
brjod pa dag las grangs gcig par ni mthong ba nyid de | dper na sgra la byas pa nyid dang mnyan 
bya dag las (em.: la ed.) rtag pa dang mi rtag pa nyid du the tshom za ba yin no zhe na |  
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doubt whether sound is impermanent or permanent on account of 
[the two contradictory reasons:] “because it is a product” (kṛtakatva) 
and “because it is audible” (śrāvaṇatva) (see Kitagawa, 1965: 194; Tille-
mans, 2000: 93, fn. 332; Ono, 2010: 127). 
From this description, one can reconstruct two proofs whose reasons 
result in the following antinomy: 
 Proof 1 Proof 2 
[Thesis:] Sound is impermanent, Sound is permanent, 
[Reason:] because it is a product, because it is audible, 
[Example:] like a pot. like sound-hood. 
As Kitagawa (1973: 194), Tillemans (2000: 93) and Ono (2010: 131) have 
explained, in this debate, a Vaiśeṣika advocate who accepts the imper-
manence of sound presents Proof 1. In response, another disputant, who 
does not accept the impermanence of sound, presents Proof 2 to show 
that the Vaiśeṣika’s logical reason is antinomic. This is because the two 
reasons, both acceptable to the Vaiśeṣika, lead to mutually contradictory 
theses, namely, in the first case, that sound is permanent, and in the 
second, that it is impermanent. Since the Vaiśeṣika accepts the existence 
of universals (sāmānya) like sound-hood (śabdatva) which are grasped by 
the sense organs, the example of Proof 2 is well-formed. Thus, the Vaiśe-
ṣika is now unavoidably confronted with a contradiction between two 
conclusions that are both justified by valid logical reasons. 
In the above procedure, it is noteworthy that taken as a whole, its 
logical structure constitutes a prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) style of 
reasoning: the proponent’s claim is rebutted by a counter-proof, which 
reveals the absurdity of the proponent’s metaphysical presuppositions. 
In other words, to establish viruddhāvyabhicārin, the proponent’s ontolo-
gical system must contain some inconsistencies or absurdities. In the 
case of the Vaiśeṣika ontology, universals are categorized as eternal enti-
ties, which is directly perceived by the sense organs; yet the similarity 
between sound-hood and sound itself leads one to the conclusion that 
sound is eternal, which is contrary to their own position. This implies 
that the fallacy of viruddhāvyabhicārin only occurs when a proponent 
presents a proof that relies on an inconsistent metaphysical system. Dig-
nāga says:  
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PSVK (ad PS 3.24cd, Kitagawa, 1965: 498:) gal te ’di la yang mi rtag pa nyid 
kyi gtan tshigs byas pa nyid la sogs pa ’ga’ zhig ston par mi byed na ni ’gyur 
na | gnyi ga dmigs pa na ’gal ba dag don gcig la mi srid pa’i phyir the tshom 
gyi rgyu yin no || ’di la yang mngon sum dang lung stobs dang ldan pa’i phyir 
de kho na las nges pa btsal bar bya ’o zhes bya ba’i...5  
= Ono, 2010: 133, fn. 16, 134, fn. 18: yady atrānityatvahetuṃ kṛtakatvādi 
kaścin na nidarśayet. dvayor upalabdhayor viruddhaikārthāsambhavāt saṃ-
śayahetuḥ. atra ca pratyakṣāgamasya balīyastvam. tata eva niścayo ’nveṣya 
iti. 
[One might argue: “The reason, ‘because of being audible’ (i.e., the 
fifth reason in Dignāga’s wheel of reason) would be a valid logical 
reason for the Vaiśeṣika school if one presents ‘sound’ as its subject 
and ‘permanence’ as the property to be proved.” To this, the follow-
ing reply is given: “It would be so,] if on this [subject,] no one presents 
the reason ‘being a product,’ etc., as the reason for impermanence. 
[However,] if the two [reasons] are cognized [together], this is a cause 
for doubt, because it is impossible to [apply] two contradictory [rea-
sons] to the same object. And in this case, a scripture based on per-
ception (pratyakṣāgama)6 is more powerful. Only from this [kind of 
scripture] is a determination [of truth] to be sought” (see Kitagawa, 
1965: 203f.; Ono, 2010: 132). 
Here, Dignāga is discussing the problem of the fifth reason in the wheel 
of reason, asādhāraṇānaikāntika, which is, as is well known, the most 
problematic part when considering the generation of the theory of inter-
-------------------------------------------------- 
5 PSVV (ad PS 3.24cd, Kitagawa, 1965: 498): gal te ’di la byas pa’i phyir zhes pa la sogs pa mi 
rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs su nam yang mi ston na ’o || gnyis ka dmigs pa’i don ltan na ni ’gal 
ba’i don yin pa’i phyir the tshom gyi gtan tshigs so || ’di yang de nyid nges pa ni rjes su tshol ba 
po rnams kyi mngon sum dang ldan pa’i phyir ro; 若於爾時，無有顯示所作性等，是無常
因，容有此義。然倶可得一義相違，不容有故，是猶豫因。又於此中現教力勝故，
應依此思求決定 (NM, T32:1628.2b20-24). 
6 As Kitagawa (1965: 203, fn. 381) has noted, the term pratyakṣāgama is translated into Ti-
betan as a dvandva compound: mngon sum dang lung, but according to Jinendrabuddhi’s 
commentary, it can be interpreted as a tatpuruṣa compound. The same term in Chinese 
(xianjiao 現教) is also interpreted as either a dvandva compound or a tatpuruṣa com-
pound. See Kuiji’s discussion below. 
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nal pervasion (antarvyāpti). The proof “sound is permanent because it is 
audible, like sound-hood” seems to be a valid reason, at least for the Vai-
śeṣika. But when its contradictory proof, “Sound is impermanent be-
cause it is a product, like a pot,” is taken into consideration, the reason 
in this proof forms a viruddhāvyabhicārin, an antinomic reason, which 
causes doubt in the minds of the audience. It is noteworthy that here, 
Dignāga does not mention the sequence of the two proofs; for him, it 
does not matter which proof is presented first. This point will be men-
tioned again when we examine Kuiji’s interpretation of this type of rea-
son. 
Moreover, the last sentence of the above argument is also remarkable: 
Dignāga concludes that scripture based on perception is necessary to de-
termine whether or not sound is permanent. On this point, Kitagawa 
(1965: 204) has provided the following comment:  
It should be noted here that the phenomenon of viruddhāvyabhicārin, 
in which two different reasons establish contradictory conclusions on 
one and the same subject, occurs only when one presents a reason 
that relies on incorrect teachings; it does not occur when one pre-
sents a reason that relies on teachings that are coherent with percep-
tions, etc. This implies that Dignāga implicitly accepts that all entities 
in this universe exist within a mutually logical harmony. This is be-
cause one can probably say that if the entities in this universe main-
tained this kind of logical harmony with one another, and if one only 
used reasoning based on correct teachings, namely, correct cosmo-
logy, a phenomenon such as viruddhāvyabhicārin would not occur.7 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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Dignāga’s philosophical endeavor is sometimes considered to be aiming 
at a certain kind of formal logic that would be acceptable to any religion 
or school, beyond the framework of Buddhism (see Katsura, 2012: 44). 
However, inasmuch as viruddhāvyabhicārin is concerned, we need an ad-
ditional note about the exceptional case in which Dignāga dogmatically 
distinguishes between “correct” teachings and “wrong” teachings.  
In the above sketch of Dignāga’s treatment of viruddhāvyabhicārin, we 
might ask why, in the context of the wheel of reason, Dignāga needed to 
discuss the antinomic reason and classify it as an “inconclusive” reason. 
On this point, his follower Dharmakīrti found a clear answer by separa-
ting the discussion of viruddhāvyabhicārin from the context of the wheel 
of reason. According to Dharmakīrti, the antinomic reason should be 
considered part of “scripturally based inference” (āgamāpekṣānumāna), 
not “inference functioning by the force of real entities” (vastubalapravṛt-
tānumāna). In his Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti says:  
NB 3.110-114: viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśayahetur uktaḥ | sa iha kasmān 
noktaḥ ||110|| anumānaviṣaye ’sambhavāt ||111|| na hi sambhavo ’sti kārya-
svabhāvayor uktalakṣaṇayor anupalambhasya ca viruddhatāyāḥ ||112|| na 
cānyo ’vyabhicārī ||113|| tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśra-
yam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa 
uktaḥ ||114|| 
[Question:] The antinomic reason is also stated [by Digānga] as a cause 
producing doubt. Why is it not mentioned here (i.e., in the classi-
fication of the inconclusive reason)?  
[Reply:] Because [the antinomic reason] cannot occur with regard to 
an object of inference [that relies on the triple characteristics of rea-
son]. For there can be no [other reasons] contradictory to kāryahetu, 
svabhāvahetu, and anupalabdhihetu, [which fulfill] the above-‌mention-
ed [triple] characteristics, and there is no non-deviating reason other 
than [these three kinds of reasons]. Therefore, only when one inves-
tigates the meaning of [scripture] by relying on scripturally based in-
ference that does not presuppose the observation of reality is virud-
dhāvyabhicārin stated as a fallacy of reason (NB III 110-114). 
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As is well known, Dharmakīrti found the foundation of the inference in 
the necessary connection through the essential nature [of entities] (sva-
bhāvapratibandha), namely, causal relation (tadutpatti) or essential 
identity (tādātmya). From the viewpoint of this necessary connection, a 
valid reason can be restricted to only three types, namely, kāryahetu, sva-
bhāvahetu, and anupalabdhihetu. As far as inferences on the basis of empi-
rical reality are concerned, there is no room for the fallacy of viruddhāvy-
abhicārin. According to Dharmakīrti’s thinking, this fallacy occurs only in 
relation to a metaphysical world accepted by other religions and philo-
sophical schools that are supposed to exist outside empirical reality. 
Since such metaphysical worlds were invented speculatively by the re-
spective founders of the various religions and philosophical schools, 
they contain numerous contradictions that can be revealed through the 
fallacy of viruddhāvyabhicārin. To exemplify such a contradiction, Dhar-
makīrti uses the theme of universals (sāmānya), accepted by the Vaiśe-
ṣika school, and constructs an example of viruddhāvyabhicārin that estab-
lishes two contradictory conclusions, namely, the omnipresence (sarva-
traga) of universals and their non-omnipresence (see NB 3.117-120; Mori-
yama, 2013).  
In this manner, in Dharmakīrti’s system of logic, viruddhāvyabhicārin 
was removed from the wheel of reasons and occupied its own domain 
outside of empirical reality. At the same time, viruddhāvyabhicārin ended 
its role as a useful means for driving an opponent to self-contradiction, 
because in Dharmakīrti’s logic there is little room for open discussion 
about religious issues beyond empirical reality.8 However, until Dharma-
kīrti’s interpretation, it seems that Dignāga’s viruddhāvyabhicārin was 
quite useful as a tool of debate. Since Xuanzang and Kuiji’s periods of ac-
tivity fall exactly in the period between these two thinkers, by examin-
ing their ideas, another development of this same logical concept, in a 
place far to the east of India, comes into view. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
8 Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Dignāga’s PS 3.23-24 and several commentaries on 
Dharmakīrti’s PV 4.65, NB 3.110-120, and HB *31.6-*33.1 are the best materials for stu-
dying viruddhāvyabhicārin in the post-Dharmakīrti period. However, such a comprehen-
sive study is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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1    Viruddhāvyabhicārin in the Nyāyapraveśaka and its 
interpretations by Jain commentators 
Following Dignāga’s system of logic, the author of the NP, Śaṅkarasvā-
min,9 presents viruddhāvyabhicārin as one of six kinds of inconclusive 
reason as follows:  
NP 6.13-15: viruddhāvyabhicārī yathā–anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭa-
vad iti. nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavad iti. ubhayoḥ saṃśaya-
hetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko ’naikāntikaḥ bhavati samuditāv eva.  
The antinomic reason (viruddhāvyabhicārin) is, for example: “Sound is 
impermanent because it is a product, like a pot,” and “Sound is per-
manent because it is audible, like sound-hood.” [Together] these two 
[reasons] become a cause of doubt, since if the two [reasons] are com-
bined they form a single inconclusive reason (anaikāntika). 
This statement conveys almost the same meaning as Dignāga’s argument 
in his PS. As we will see below, Kuiji’s interpretation of this statement 
has some unique features. However, in order to understand the special 
character of his interpretation, we should first look at the Indian under-
standing of this concept. At present we have only two Sanskrit commen-
taries on the NP, namely, a commentary called Śiṣyahitā or Nyāyapraveśa-
kavṛtti (NPV) ascribed to the Jain author Haribhadrasūri (eighth century), 
and the sub-commentary thereto called Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā 
(NPVP) by Pārśvadevagaṇi (thirteenth century). What follows is a sum-
-------------------------------------------------- 
9 Modern scholars hold two opinions with regard to the authorship of NP, namely, 
Dignāga or Śaṅkarasvāmin. This discussion is summarized in Inami, 2011: 23-26. Inami 
has pointed out that in the ninefold classification of pakṣābhāsa, four items that were 
added by the author of the NP are refuted by various followers of Dharmakīrti, namely, 
Śākyabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin. This fact prob-
ably shows, as many scholars now believe, that Dignāga is not the author of the NP. It 
seems unreasonable to suppose that Dharmakīrti’s followers would criticize their mas-
ter’s opinion. Thus, I am also of the opinion that Śaṅkarasvāmin was the author of the 
NP. 
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mary of their arguments, especially focusing on those points that are 
comparable to Kuiji’s interpretation.10  
Analysis of the compound viruddhāvyabhicārin: The compound is 
analyzed by Haribhadra as a tatpuruṣa, which means “[a reason] that 
does not deviate from a contradictory [reason, i.e., the other reason 
that proves what is contradictory to the intended conclusion]” (vi-
ruddhaṃ na vyabhicarati).11 In addition, he criticizes the other option 
of interpreting the compound as a karmadhāraya, namely, “the 
reason that is contradictory and non-deviant” (viruddhaś cāsāv avy-
abhicārī ca), because being contradictory and being non-deviant are 
opposed to each other, and because this interpretation would result 
in the theory of perspectivism (anekāntavāda) (see NPV 37.13-14). On 
the other hand, Pārśvadeva shows a way to accept both interpreta-
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 In Pārśvadeva’s explanation, there is also an interesting discussion on the necessity of 
preliminary investigation before presenting an antinomic reason. Since it is obvious 
that the discussion is constructed under the influence of Dharmakīrti, I would like to 
just summarize the discussion in the following. In Pārśvadeva’s understanding, every 
reason contains the possibility of being interpreted as a viruddhāvyabhicārin; the pri-
mary role of the reason is to establish its own target property, not to refute its coun-
ter-proof. Thus, when presenting a certain reason, it is not possible to avoid being 
attacked by its counter-proof. Therefore one should begin by using another method 
(upāyāntara) to determine the target property. In other words, before starting a proof, 
one should rebut the property that is contradictory to the target property through 
logical reasoning (yukti). As a typical method for this kind of reasoning, Pārśvadeva 
proposes Dharmakīrti’s sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa (NPVP 92.18-23). However, 
when a disputant cannot demonstrate the necessary connection (avinābhāva) between 
a logical reason and its target property through the method of invalidating the 
reason’s presence in the dissimilar example (i.e., sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa) and 
when he cannot criticize the other proof as being non-established (asiddha), the falla-
cious reason called viruddhāvyabhicārin occurs (NPVP 93.21f). This exposition by Pār-
śvadeva is clearly based on his knowledge of Dharmakīrtian logic, which aims at estab-
lishing the necessary connection between the logical reason and its target property. If 
we rigorously follow Pārśvadeva’s procedure, we must admit that viruddhāvyabhicārin 
occurs only if the necessary connection is not ascertained. However, in the period 
before Dharmakīrti, this was not how viruddhāvyabhicārin was understood, as we will 
see in the next section. 
11 NPV 37.10-12. On this passage, Pārśvadeva comments as follows (NPVP 92.12f.): taṃ 
viruddhaṃ śrāvaṇatvākhyaṃ na vyabhicarati kṛtakatvalakṣaṇo viruddhāvyabhicārī.  
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tions. In order to defend the karmadhāraya interpretation, he ex-
plains the compound as follows: “[A reason] is a contradictory 
[reason] because it proves that which is contradictory to what is to 
be proved by another reason; [the same reason] is non-deviant from 
what is to be proved by [the reason] itself.”12 These two interpre-
tations are also held by certain followers of Dharmakīrti, as for ex-
ample Jinendrabuddhi and Dharmottara.13  
Explanation of the two proofs: According to Haribhadra, while the 
first proof is presented by a Vaiśeṣika, the second is presented by a 
Mīmāṃsaka. With regard to the example of “sound-hood”, Hari-
bhadra notes that it is a lower universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa) by means 
of which one is able to express and cognize “sound” with regard to 
the various particular sounds that are produced by musical 
instruments (see NPV 37.14-19). Pārśvadeva does not provide any 
information concerning the two disputants of the debate.  
Explanation of the phrase “cause of doubt”: With regard to the 
phrase “cause of doubt” (saṃśayahetu), Haribhadra explains that 
when the two reasons are combined, the complex reason becomes a 
cause of doubt about whether sound is permanent or not. If the two 
reasons were combined (samasta), the first reason would also be an 
over-exclusive, inconclusive reason (asādhāraṇānaikāntika) like the 
second; on the other hand, if the two reasons were separate (vyasta), 
each reason would be considered a valid logical reason because 
they both fulfill the necessary triple characteristics. It is only when 
the two reasons are mutually dependent (parasparasāpekṣa) that 
they become viruddhāvyabhicārin (see NPV 37.19-38.7).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
12 NPVP 93.16f.: yadi tu sādhanāntarasiddhasya viruddhasādhanād viruddhaḥ svasādhyāvy-
abhicārāc cāvyabhicārī tato viruddhaś cāsāv avyabhicārī ca viruddhāvyabhicārīty ucyate, tadā 
syād eva.  
13 For Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretations, see Ono, 2010: 129, fn. 9. Ono regards this sen-
tence (viruddhayor avyabhicāraḥ, so ’syāstīti viruddhāvyabhicārī) as evidence for a bahu-
vrīhi interpretation, but in my view, it reveals that it has been interpreted as a tat-
puruṣa. See NPVP 92.15: viruddhasyāvyabhicāraḥ so ’syāstītīyam api vyutpattir jñeyā. For 
Dharmottara’s interpretation, see Tillemans, 2000: 92. 
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2   Kuiji’s explanation of the viruddhāvyabhicārin section in NP 
Kuiji, one of the great pupils of Xuanzang, wrote an extended commen-
tary on NP. Although we know little about his knowledge of Sanskrit and 
Buddhist logic as transmitted from his master Xuanzang, his commen-
tary is clearly good material for understanding the actual state of Chi-
nese Buddhist logic in its early stages (see Ui, 1966: 294; Nakamura, 1960). 
In the following, we shall examine Kuiji’s commentary on Śaṅkarasvā-
min’s argument about viruddhāvyabhicārin, which is divided by Kuiji into 
three parts: (1) the problem of the name (biao ming 標名), (2) the presen-
tation of two proofs (xian zong yin 顯宗因), and (3) a conclusion.  
2.1   Analysis of the compound  
First of all, let us start with Kuiji’s interpretation of the compound virud-
dhāvyabhicārin:  
YRZLS: 具三相因, 各自決定, 成相違之宗, 名相違決定。相違之決
定, 決定令相違, 第三第六兩囀, 倶是依主釋也 (T44:1840.126a21-
23). 
[A pair of reasons] are called an “antinomic reason”, when each [rea-
son] is determinative due to [its] fulfilling the triple characteristic [for 
a valid logical reason] and when [each reason] establishes [a mutually] 
contradictory thesis. [The compound can be analyzed as] a “deter-
minative [reason] of the contradictory [thesis]” or a “[reason] that 
causes [its thesis] to contradict [the other thesis] through [its] 
determinative [reason]”, namely, [it is either] a genitive tatpuruṣa or 
an instrumental tatpuruṣa.  
Here Kuiji provides two interpretations of the compound. Of the two, 
analyzing the compound as a genitive tatpuruṣa (xiangwei zhi jueding 相
違之決定) seems less problematic, even though there are other possible 
ways to connect the first component (i.e., xiangwei 相違, viruddha) to the 
second (i.e., jueding 決定, avyabhicārin) through other case-endings. 
However, Kuiji’s second analysis (jueding ling xiangwei 決定令相違) is 
unreasonable, not because it is an instrumental tatpuruṣa, but because it 
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interprets the second component as possessing the instrumental case-‌
ending “by means of avyabhicārin”. In this case, by means of a determina-
tive (or non-deviant) reason such as kṛtakatva, in combination with 
another reason such as śrāvaṇatva, we arrive at a contradiction between 
the permanence and the impermanence of sound. What this exposition 
intends to claim is perfectly understandable. In Sanskrit grammar, how-
ever, a compound is interpreted as an instrumental tatpuruṣa when the 
first component, in the instrumental case, determines the second. Thus, 
Kuiji’s analysis, which reverses the order of the two components, is im-
possible.14 Presumably, Kuiji understood that a compound can be clas-
sified as an instrumental tatpuruṣa if it is possible to analyze either of its 
two components as instrumental to the other, but this would show that 
his knowledge of Sanskrit was limited.15  
2.2   Explanation of the two proofs 
Next, we turn to the problem of identifying the opponent who presents 
the second proof. The Jain commentator Haribhadra identifies the oppo-
nent as a certain Mīmāṃsaka, but Kuiji takes a different stance:  
-------------------------------------------------- 
14 In order to understand Kuiji’s argument, it is helpful to consult the Inmyōron so myōtō 
shō (因明論疏明灯抄, T2270, hereafter Myōtōshō), written by a pioneer Japanese 








令宗相違，即依因力故，決定令相違。是依主釋也 (T68:2270.362b10-25). Following 
the grammatical explanations of the Yogācārabhūmi, in the underlined passage, Zenju 
explains Kuiji’s second analysis as follows: “Because it causes [its thesis] to contradict 
[the intended conclusion] [precisely] by means of the reason, [Kuiji says:] ‘[a reason] 
that causes [its thesis] to contradict [the intended conclusion] by [its] determinative 
nature’. This is based on interpretation [of the term] as a tatpuruṣa compound.”  
15 On Kuiji’s knowledge of Sanskrit grammar, see Teng, 2011, Chap. 3. 
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YRZLS: 此乃勝論對聲生論。義如前説, 若對聲顯隨一不成 (T44:
1840.126b4-5). 
That is to say, [the first proof] is [presented] by the Vaiśeṣika (Sheng-
lun 勝論) against those who claim that sound is produced (*śabdot-
pattivādin, shengshenglun 聲生論). As has been argued previously, if 
[the proof] were [presented] against those who claim that sound is 
[merely] made manifest (śabdābhivyaktivādin, shengxianlun 聲顯論), it 
would be a [reason] that is not established for either the proponent or 
the opponent (anyatarāsiddha, suiyi bu cheng 隨一不成).  
Certainly, Śaṅkarasvāmin had already claimed that the reason “because 
it is a product” constitutes an anyatarāsiddha fallacy when that reason is 
presented against a Śabdābhivyaktivādin.16 Therefore, in order to avoid 
this fallacy, it seems necessary to assume a different figure/school who/
which is claiming the permanence of sound. Kuiji introduces this figure/
school with the name “those who claim that sound is produced” (*Śab-
dotpattivādin, shengshenglun 聲生論); this figure is different from the 
Śabdābhivyaktivādin. 17  These two advocates of the permanence of 
sound are mentioned by Kuiji in several discussions in his Yinming ru 
zhengli lun shu (因明入正理論疏, hereafter YRLZS) and Dacheng fayuan yi 
-------------------------------------------------- 
16 NP 4.20: kṛtakatvād iti śabdābhivyaktivādinaṃ praty anyatarāsiddhaḥ. 
17 We have no Indian source for a group called *Śabdotpattivādin (shengshenglun 聲生
論). Hōjō (1980) claimed that the Śabdotpattivādin represents the Vaiśeṣika theory of 
language, but he did not present any evidence for this identification. On this point, 
however, Prof. Tōru Funayama has kindly informed me about the following passage 
from the commentary by Wengui (文軌) on the NP：今鵂鶹子等對聲顯論，立量云，
聲是無常，因云，所作性故。彼聲顯論雖計聲從緣顯，其若太虛無所作義。今鵂鶹
等云，所作性者但是自許聲有此義。他聲顯論不許聲有。此則自成他不成也(...)又
釋，其所作因有生有顯。生即鵂鶹等許*，顯即聲顯論許* (see Shen, 2008: 347, where 
the reading ji 計 is accepted instead of xu 許). In the above passage, Wengui attri-
butes the theory of *Śabdotpattivāda (shengshenglun 聲生論) to Ulūka (Xiuliuzi 鵂鶹
子, i.e., Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school) and others, and thus we know 
that Kuiji’s interpretation was not the only one concerning this group. However, be-
cause of space constraints, I cannot here compare the two interpretations of Xuan-
zang’s two pupils further, but I do plan to do so on another occasion.  
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lin zhang (大乘法苑義林章).18 It should be noted here that “sound” or 
sheng (聲) in Kuiji’s terminology is a complex concept that can be inter-
preted not only as a “physical sound” but also as a “signifer” and as 
“sound-‌hood”. I will use the term “sound” in the broad sense covering 
those aspects. By contrast, to indicate more precisely the first sense only, 
I will use “mere sound”:  
1) YRZLS:聲生説聲總有三類：一者響音。雖耳所聞, 不能詮表。如




The Śabdotpattivādin claims that “sound” generally has three aspects: 
[1] Mere sound, which is audible, but cannot denote [an object-
meaning], just as, when one speaks in the vicinity of a cave, there is 
an additional [set of] word[s] in the echo; [2] Sound-hood. There is 
both a class and a genus (xing, lei 性類) in each signifer (nengquan 能
詮, *abhidhāna?). Outside of the signifer, [sound-hood] exists origi-
nally in permanence. It is not cognizable without a condition (yuan 
縁). Once it comes into conjunction with the [appropriate] conditions 
[to make it] newly come into being, it becomes audible. [This] is 
different from the [idea of the] Vaiśeṣika; [3] Signifer (nengquan 能詮), 
which exists separately from the first two (i.e., mere sound and 
sound-hood). The mere sound and this signifer both come into being 
anew. This mere sound cannot denote [an object]. Now [i.e., when the 
Śabdotpattivādin presents the subject], this sound (i.e., signifer), 
which has newly come into being, is permanent [after it has arisen]. 
[The Śabdotpattivādin] can [therefore] present originally existing 
sound-hood (ben you sheng xing 本有聲性) as the similar example 
(tongpin 同品, *sapakṣa). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
18 In Kuiji’s Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang (大乘法苑義林章, T1861), six heretical theories 
are enumerated: the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the *Vedavāda, the Śabdābhivyaktivāda, 
the *Śabdotpattivāda, and the Lokāyata (shulun 數論, shenglun 勝論, minglun 明論, 
shengxianlun 聲顯論, shengshenglun 聲生論, shunshilun 順世論). 








作爲因。若對聲顯, 勤勇爲因 (T44:1840.108a27-b7). 
Among the Śabdavādins (shenglunshi 聲論師), there are generally two 
types: First, [the *Śabdotpattivādin claims that] sound comes into 
being in accordance with conditions, and [that] it is eternal and non-
perishing. Second, [the Śabdābhivyaktivādin claims that] sound is ori-
ginally permanent; it becomes manifest in accordance with condi-
tions, and only then is it audible; when the conditions, together with 
the mere sound, cease, it returns [to its original nature] and becomes 
inaudible. It is the same in the case of the *Śabdotpattivādin: when 
the condition ceases, [the sound] is inaudible; because the condition 
exists, it is audible. These two masters both [accept] that there are 
differences [in the sound] concerning the parts, the whole, [what is] 
internal [to it], and [what is] external [to it], because of distinctions 
between single essence and multiple essences in the signifer.19 If the 
Buddhist claims the impermanence of sound against the *Śabdotpat-
tivādin, the reason “being a product” (*krtakavta) fulfills the triple 
characteristics [of a valid reason]. However, if [the same thesis] is pre-
sented against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, [the reason] “being a 
product” constitutes [the fallacious reason called] anyatarāsiddha. If 
[the thesis] is presented against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, [the rea-
son] “[coming into being] immediately after intentional effort” (*pra-
yatnānantarīyakatva) fulfills the triple characteristics [of a valid 
reason]. If [the thesis] “all sounds are impermanent” is presented 
against the *Śabdotpattivādin with the reason “[coming into being] 
immediately after intentional effort”, [the reason] does not pervade 
the property of the subject [i.e., it does not fulfill the first character-
istic of a valid reason, pakṣadharmatva] and thus, it constitutes [the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
19 This sentence is still unclear to me.  
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fallacious reason called] ubhayāsiddha. It is now clear that one 
[should] present the reason “being a product” against the *Śabdot-
pattivādin, and the reason “[coming into being] immediately after in-
tentional effort” against the Śabdābhivyaktivādin. 






The Śabdābhivyaktivāda [claims that] the nature of sound originally 
exists, and then becomes manifest in reliance upon its conditions. 
This nature is permanent. When one examines this nature, there are 
two types: [1] First, there is a permanent sound that signifies [each 
object] in accordance with the [corresponding] entity, like non-ana-
lytical cessation (apratisaṅkhyānirodha).20 In terms of what is made 
manifest by sounds pronounced on the basis of reasoning (*vitarka) 
and reflection (*vicāra), etc., [mere] sound is impermanent; here, 
[however,] these plural [sounds] take the eternal sound (i.e., signifer) 
as their essence; [2] second, there is a single, permanent sound that 
signifies [an object] that exists commonly in all entities (dharmas), like 
suchness. In terms of what is made manifest by sounds pronounced 
on the basis of reasoning and reflection, etc., the [mere] sound is 
impermanent; here, [however,] we take only the singular, eternal 
sound as the essence. The mere sounds, etc., are only conditions for 
the manifestation [of the single, eternal sound], and [the single, eter-
nal sound] is not the essence of the signifer. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
20 For non-analytical cessation (apratisaṅkhyānirodha), see AK 1.6cd and AKBh on the half 
stanza. Unlike analytical cessation, which obstructs the arising of defilements by the 
power of wisdom, this non-analytical cessation concerns every entity (dharma). Ac-
cording to Vasubandhu’s exposition, this cessation obstructs the arising of a future 
entity when it lacks the conditions for its arising. Since this cessation is permanent 
and applicable to each entity, Kuiji uses the concept as the example for sound as a 
signifer. 
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When we examine the *Śabdotpattivāda, [its doctrine is as follows:] 
Sound originally does not exist, but it comes into being in reliance 
upon conditions. Once it has come into being, it is everlasting. Be-
cause [sound] is brought into being by mere sounds, etc., there are 
two ways of enumerating [it]: [1] First, we can count it as multiple in 
nature, like non-analytical cessation; [2] second, we can count it as 
singular in nature, like suchness; here, [however,] we take the sound 
that is everlasting after newly coming into being (xin sheng chang 
sheng 新生常聲) as the essence [of sound] because it signifies [each 
object]. The mere sound is not the signifer. 
From these descriptions – despite the fact that they contain a number of 
expressions that are difficult for me to understand – we can see how the 
two figures/schools differ: 
The Śabdābhivyaktivādin does not accept the reason “being a product” 
(kṛtakatva); he only accepts “coming into being immediately after in-
tentional effort” (prayatnānantarīyakatva). According to this belief, the 
essences/essence of sound – either multiple in accordance with the 
objects being signified, or having a single nature – are/is eternal and 
become/-s manifest in reliance upon conditions such as mere sounds 
produced by reasoning and reflection. The Śabdābhivyaktivādin 
seems to equate the signifer with the eternal essence of sound. 
The *Śabdotpattivādin accepts the reason “being a product”. Unlike 
the Śabdābhivyaktivādin, he claims that sound is produced by mere 
sound. Thus, for him, the permanence of sound means that a sound 
continues eternally after it is produced. According to the description 
in the NP-commentary, he distinguishes sound-hood from mere 
sound and signifer. However, in the Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang, it is 
said that for him, sound does not originally exist (sheng ben wu 聲本
無). It is significant that this *Śabdotpattivādin claims that sound-
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hood is audible when it fulfills the conditions upon which it newly 
comes into being (xin sheng yuan 新生縁). 
Supposing this *Śabdotpattivādin as the opponent, Kuiji provides a clear 
picture of a specific debate in which the two disputants share concepts 
relating to the proofs, including the reason “being a product” and the 
example “sound-hood”.  
2.3   How do we determine the winner of the debate? 
As seen in the previous section, when commenting on the antinomic 
reason, Kuiji aims at reconstructing a debate between a Vaiśeṣika and a 
*Śabdotpattivādin. However, if this is a real debate, one should be able to 
determine who the winner is. In the case of the debate under discussion, 
a Vaiśeṣika first presents a proof of the impermanence of sound, where-
upon the opponent presents a counter-proof. Of the two antinomic rea-
sons, then, neither kṛtakatva nor śrāvaṇatva results in a decisive conclu-
sion.  
In this situation, Śaṅkarasvāmin simply says, “both [reasons] are a 
cause of doubt; these two combined constitute a single inconclusive 
[reason]” (ubhayoḥ saṃśayahetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko ’naikāntikaḥ bhavati 
samuditāv eva). Commenting on this passage, Kuiji explains that the au-
thor’s intention consists in avoiding the misconception that in the case 
of viruddhāvyabhicārin, the one who presents the counter-proof gains the 
advantage and becomes the winner. Indeed, this was the idea expressed 
by Wengui (文軌, d.u.), a predecessor of Kuiji.21  
Kuiji points out the error in this idea by quoting Dignāga’s statement: 
“And here, since pratyakṣāgama predominates, exactly by this [means] 
one should seek a determination [as to whether sound is permanent or 
-------------------------------------------------- 
21 See Takemura, 1986: 227-232. As Takemura has emphasized, the above is Kuiji’s under-
standing of Wengui’s discussion (Takemura, 1986: 230). Unlike the above summary, 
Wengui claims that the winner of the debate is determined by perception and Bud-
dhist scripture; if both proponent and opponent are opposed by perception and scrip-
ture, the one who first presents a proof is defeated, whereupon the other becomes the 
winner.  
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not]” (又於此中現教力勝故応依此思求決定).22 The compound praty-
akṣāgama (xianjiao 現教) is analyzed by Kuiji in three different ways: (1) 
what is experienced in common by the world (xian 現＝shijian 世間) 
and the Buddha’s teaching (jiao 教＝fojiao 佛教), (2) teaching based on 
Śākyamuni Buddha’s direct experience (Shijia fo xianzheng 釋迦佛現證), 
and (3) teaching based on what is accepted by the world (shijian xian 世
間現) (see T44:1840.126c9-17). In each case, Kuiji judges the Vaiśeṣika to 
be the winner of the debate. However, as Kuiji explains, to eliminate the 
misconception that victory always goes to the one who presents the 
counter-proof, Śaṅkarasvāmin concludes the section with the words, 
“both are inconclusive [reasons]”.  
In the above exposition, Kuiji seems to ignore the importance of the 
“antinomy” of viruddhāvyabhicārin. Certainly, in a real debate, one must 
decide who the winner is. As we have seen in the introduction, from a 
logical viewpoint, this type of fallacious reason has the destructive func-
tion of driving the opponent’s position into self-contradiction. As in 
other prasaṅga-style arguments, it is important to reveal the failure of 
the opponent’s implicit presupposition logically, and yet, Kuiji’s inter-
pretation does not seem to do this. Nonetheless, we must refrain from 
concluding that Kuiji has completely ignored the “antinomy” in virud-
dhāvyabhicārin until we have examined his three types of inference. 
2.4   Kuiji’s typology of viruddhāvyabhicārin 
Soon after the exposition of the concluding passage of this section, Kuiji 
adds some additional arguments concerning his own ideas on virud-
dhāvyabhicārin. These contain, in my view, three remarkable points:  
A) The typology of viruddhāvyabhicārin: According to Kuiji, viruddhāvy-
abhicārin can be classified into three types according to the situation 
-------------------------------------------------- 
22 Katsura, 1979: 77. In YRZLS (T44:1840.126b29-c4), Kuiji quotes a passage of NM in order 
to criticize the interpretation of a former master (i.e., Wengui) that in a debate, the 
disputant who presents his proof second, after the first disputant, is the winner when 
the two proofs are equally valid, as in the case of stopping a slow (i.e., inconclusive) 
game of go, where one judges the player who took the second move of the game as the 
winner (古有斷言：如殺遲碁, 後下爲勝).  
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of the debate, namely: (1) a situation in which one is refuting the 
other’s proof from one’s own position; (2) a situation in which one is 
defending one’s position from the other’s refutation; and (3) a situa-
tion in which two disputants argue while commonly accepting the 
concepts used in their proofs.  
B) The relation between viruddhāvyabhicārin and anumānaviruddha: The 
fallacy of viruddhāvyabhicārin is encompassed in the fallacious thesis 
called “thesis contradicted by another inference” (anumānaviruddha).  
C) Four kinds of viruddha and viruddhāvyabhicārin: In the NP, the contra-
dictory reason (viruddha) is classified into four types, namely, dhar-
masvarūpaviparītasādhana, dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana, dharmisvarū-
paviparītasādhana, and dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana. Kuiji claims that 
these four categories are also applicable in classifying viruddhāvy-
abhicārin into four types. These types depend upon which element of 
the thesis is contradictory to the decisive reason. 
Of the above three points, we will focus only on point A, in order to look 
for the basis of Kuiji’s understanding of viruddhāvyabhicārin. According to 
this typology, one can construct a counter-proof in three different 
situations, namely, when refuting the other’s position, when defending 
one’s own position, and during a discussion based on common accep-
tance.  
Of these three situations, the two proofs exemplified in the NP con-
cerning the permanence/impermanence of sound are understood as 
representing the third situation, namely, based upon common ground 
accepted by both disputants. In this case, all of the elements constituting 
the proof(s), such as the reason and the example, are expressed by con-
cepts that are held in common by both the proponent and the opponent. 
In this case, the inference is called “inference based on commonly ac-
cepted grounds” (共比量), and the fallacy of anyatarāsiddha should not 
occur.  
There remain the other two cases, in which the fallacy of anyatarā-
siddha is not ruled out. Kuiji explains these two cases using the terms 
svārthānumāna (“inference based on grounds one accepts oneself”, zibi-
liang 自比量) and parārthānumāna (“inference based on grounds accept-
ed by the other”, tabiliang 他比量), in a different way than they are 
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commonly understood based on the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. 
According to Kuiji, a zibiliang-inference is constructed with a logical rea-
son containing the qualifier “we accept” (zi xu 自許); in a tabiliang-infer-
ence, the reason contains the qualifier “you believe” (ru zhi 汝執).23 
Based on this classification, Kuiji distinguishes three patterns of virud-
dhāvyabhicārin:24 





[the Vaiśeṣika claims:] 
Sound is non-eternal because 
it is a product, like a pot. 
[the Śabdotpattivādin claims:] 
Sound is eternal because it is 




[the Mahāyāna claims:] 
Non-manifested matter 
(avijñaptirūpa), which you 
believe in, is not in fact 
matter (rūpa), because you 
believe that it is non-resistant 
(apratigha), like consciousness 
[the Hīnayāna claims:] 
Non-manifested matter, which 
we accept, is in fact matter, 
because we accept that it has 
the nature of matter, like color 
and sound, which we [also] 
-------------------------------------------------- 
23 Although svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna are technical terms in Indian Buddhist 
logic, which are usually translated “inference for one’s own sake” and “inference for 
others’ sake”, respectively, they are different from Kuiji’s understanding of the two 
concepts. As Teng (2011: 148-149) has noted, “These two types of inference should not 
be confused with the inference for one’s own sake svārthānumāna and inference for 
others’ sake parārthānumāna found in the Indian logic transmissions; both ‘self-anu-
māna’ and ‘other-anumāna’ are parārthānumāna.” See also Frankenhauser, 1996: 71. On 
the other hand, for the two qualifications which are particular to Chinese hetuvidyā, 
see Harbsmeier, 1998: 376-379, Frankenhauser, 1996: 55-59, Yao, 2009: 393-394, Teng, 
2011: 148-149. As for Kuiji’s definition of zibiliang 自比量, Harada (1993: 147f.) has 
pointed out its similarity to Candrakīrti’s idea of svārthānumāna, which does not re-
quire any ground that is commonly accepted by both disputants. See Pras 35.9: svār-
thānumāne tu sarvatra svaprasiddhir eva garīyasī, nobhayaprasiddhiḥ. See also Yamazaki, 
1960.  
24 Frankenhauser (1996: 72) presents a typology of inference which contains an addition-
al fourth pattern, refutation of a gongbiliang-inference by a zibiliang-inference. How-
ever, I am doubtful whether such an example exists. 
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[the Hīnayāna claims:] 
Non-manifested matter, 
which we accept, is in fact 
matter, because we accept 
that it has the nature of 
matter, like color and sound, 
which we accept. 
[the Mahāyāna claims:] 
Non-manifested matter, which 
you believe in, is not in fact 
matter, because you believe 
that it is non-resistant, like 
consciousness and mental acts. 
On first reading, the two disputants in Patterns 2 and 3 (i.e., a Mahāyāna 
Buddhist, and a Hīnayāna Buddhist as represented by a Sarvāstivādin) 
seem to be talking at cross purposes, but when one looks closer at the 
text, one soon notices that these two patterns illustrate typical examples 
of viruddhāvyabhicārin: If one ignores the qualifiers “we accept” and “you 
believe in”, the two proofs are concerned with the same subject, “non-‌
manifested matter”, and aim to establish mutually contradictory conclu-
sions, “being matter” or “not being matter”, based on different reasons, 
namely “being non-resistant” or “having the nature of matter”.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
25 YRZLS: 汝無表色定非實色, 許無對故, 如心心所 (T44:1840.126c20-21). Vasubandhu 
defines avijñaptirūpa as follows (AK 1.11): vikṣiptācittakasyāpi yo ’nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ 
| mahābhūtāny upādāya sa hy avijñaptir ucyate. This avijñaptirūpa arises by depending on 
four elements, and in accordance with the change of vijñaptirūpa, its corresponding 
avijñaptirūpa is also changed. According to Sako (1985), even though avijñaptirūpa is 
classified as one kind of “material” (rūpa), its function is closer to prāpti/aprāpti 
(karmic acquisition/non-acquisition). At any rate, also from the description in AK(Bh), 
we are aware of the problematic position of avijñaptirūpa in the Sarvāstivāda’s cate-
gorical system, and therefore, it is a good example with which to construct a virud-
dhāvyabhicārin. For Kuiji’s own interpretation of avijñaptirūpa/avijñapti and its practical 
background, see Ōtani (2004).  
26 YRZLS: 我無表色(em. cf. Dōgakushō 227b16: 無對色 ed.)定是實色, 許色性故, 如許
色聲等 (T44:1840.126c21-22). 
27 The following two proofs are not mentioned in Kuiji’s commentary on the NP. See 
Dōgakushō: 若薩婆多對大乘立量云：我無表色定是實色, 許色性故, 如許色聲等。
大乘作違決云：汝無表色定非實色, 許無對故, 如心心所者。是自比量相違決定也 
(T66:2263.227b18-22). 
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What draws our attention is the proof presented by a Mahāyana 
Buddhist to refute the Hīnayāna’s concept of avijñaptirūpa. In this proof, 
which Kuiji calls tabiliang 他比量, the Mahāyana Buddhist constructs a 
counter-argument against the opponent’s position accepting the reality 
of avijñaptirūpa by using exactly the notions acceptable to the opponent. 
We can see here one of the most representative usages of viruddhāvyabhi-
cārin: to reveal a self-contradiction in an opponent’s ontological/meta-
physical system. Thus, Kuiji was probably aware of the importance of 
“antinomy” in the cases of Patterns 2 and 3. Only in Pattern 1, however, 
does he ignore its importance, changing viruddhāvyabhicārin into a mere 
indicator of two opposite opinions in a common debate.  
Why, then, did Kuiji regard Pattern 1 as a case of viruddhāvyabhicārin? 
To reply to this question, we shall in closing investigate the relation be-
tween Kuiji’s interpretation of viruddhāvyabhicārin and Xuanzang’s proof 
of consciousness-only (weishi biliang 唯識比量). 
3    Xuanzang’s proof of consciousness-only and its relation to 
viruddhāvyabhicārin 
The famous proof of consciousness-only ascribed to Xuanzang is docu-
mented in the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu as follows:  
YRZLS: 大師立唯識比量云：眞故極成色不離於眼識宗,自許初三攝
眼所不攝故因, 猶如眼識喩 (T44:1840.115b25-26). 
Master (Xuanzang) presented an inference for consciousness-only as 
follows: “From the ultimate viewpoint (zhen gu 真故, *paramārthatas), 
commonly accepted colors and forms are not separate from the visual 
consciousness (yanshi 眼識, *cakṣurvijñāna), because while being in-
cluded in the first three [of the eighteen elements] that we accept, 
they are not included in the visual sense-faculty (yan 眼, cakṣus), like 
the visual consciousness” (see Ui, 1966: 321-325; Ejima, 1980: 205; 
Franco, 2004: 205; Teng, 2011: 149-154). 
Commenting on the qualifier of the thesis “from the ultimate viewpoint”, 
Kuiji explains that due to this qualifier, this inference can avoid the 
fallacious theses called “what is contradictory to what is accepted in 
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common by the world” (shijian xiangwei 世間相違) and “what is contra-
dictory to one’s own teaching” (zijiao xiangwei 自教相違). In addition, he 
explains the qualifier for indicating the inference as a type of gongbiliang. 
In doing so, he defends the inference from the criticism of the brilliant 
Korean monk Wŏnhyo (元曉, 618-686) (see Franco, 2004: 211f.; Moro, 
2007). In a letter written to Xuanzang, Wŏnhyo challenged Xuanzang’s 
proof by formulating the following counter-proof, which leads to a pair 
of reasons constituting a viruddhāvyabhicārin:  
YRZLS: 眞故極成色定離於眼識, 自許初三攝眼識不攝故, 猶如眼
根 (T44:1840.116a20-21). 
From the ultimate viewpoint, commonly accepted colors and forms 
are separate from the visual consciousness, because while included in 
the first three [of the eighteen elements] that we accept, they are not 
included in the visual consciousness, like the visual sense-faculty (see 
Franco, 2004: 211f.).  
Using the basic framework of Xuanzang’s proof, Wŏnhyo has clearly 
constructed a counter-proof based on the Sarvāstivādin’s viewpoint. As 
Franco (2004: 212) has remarked, “At least as far as the three character-
istics are concerned, it seems that Wŏnhyo succeeded, after all, to annul 
Xuanzang’s brilliant inference.” However, Kuiji did not think this was the 
case. He claims that this counter-proof cannot be considered a virud-




故, 譬如瓶等。聲生論言：聲是其常, 所聞性故, 如自許聲性。應是
前量決定相違。彼既不成。故依自比, 不可對共而爲比量 (T44:1840.
116‌a22-29). 
Generally speaking, in Buddhist logic, “inference based on grounds 
one accepts oneself” (zibiliang 自比量) is [an inference where] thesis, 
reason, and example, are all dependent on the grounds of one’s own 
[position]. The same is [true] for [the other two types of inference, 
namely,] tabiliang and gongbiliang. When [the proponent] presents a 
zibiliang, tabiliang, or gongbiliang [type of inference], the opponent 
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should also reply with the corresponding [type of inference]. This is 
what is called “good logic”, which is free of fallacies. The above-men-
tioned [inference for] vijñaptimātratā is [presented] as a gongbiliang 
[type of inference]. Nevertheless, [Wŏnhyo] presents [as a coun-
ter-‌proof] a zibiliang [type of inference]. If this were allowed, the same 
fallacy would occur for all means of valid cognition. For instance, 
when the Buddhist claims against a Śabdotpattivādin [a gongbiliang 
type of inference such as] “Sound is impermanent, because it is a 
product, like a pot,” [to this,] the Śabdotpattivādin could claim [a 
zibiliang type of inference:] “Sound is permanent, because it is audible, 
like sound-hood, which we accept.” Exactly [this reason presented by 
the Śabdotpattivādin] would be an antinomic reason to the previous 
means of valid cognition [i.e., the previous inference by the Buddhist], 
but this [antinomic reason] is not established. Therefore, it is impos-
sible to reply to a gongbiliang-inference by making a zibiliang-‌inference.  
In this manner, supposing Xuanzang’s proof to be a gongbiliang-inference, 
Kuiji criticizes Wŏnhyo by pointing out the impossibility of constructing 
a counter-proof in the form of a zibiliang-inference. However, it is un-
deniable that this critique of Kuiji’s is unfair. In fact, he classifies Wŏn-
hyo’s proof as a zibiliang-type just because of the expression “we accept” 
(zi xu 自許), which qualifies the reason. But in that case, why does he 
not classify Xuanzang’s proof as a zibiliang-type for the same reason, 
since it also uses the term “we accept” as a qualifier of the reason? Kuiji 
replies that the qualifier “we accept” plays a different role in Xuanzang’s 
proof, namely, the role of avoiding the fallacy of dharmiviśeṣaviparītasā-
dhana; thus, it does not indicate that it is a zibiliang-inference. This is cer-
tainly a lame excuse, and yet, for Kuiji, there was probably no other way 
to defend the glory of his master’s proof from Wŏnhyo’s criticism, within 
the innovative schema of three patterns of viruddhāvyabhicārin.28 
-------------------------------------------------- 
28 In order to examine this issue in more detail, we would need to understand Xuan-
zang’s concept of the three kinds of inferences and their qualifiers, namely, “we ac-
cept”, “you believe in”, and “both accept in common”. In this regard, our attention is 
drawn by Xuanzang’s criticism of the proof of Jayasena (Shengjun 勝軍). Cf. T44:1840.
121b21-23.  
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4   Conclusion 
We have examined here a significant logical concept, viruddhāvyabhicārin, 
from various trans-cultural viewpoints, from India to China, as develop-
ed over a timespan of five to seven centuries. The findings of this study 
can be summarized as follows:  
1. With regard to the analysis of the compound viruddhāvyabhicārin, 
Kuiji’s first interpretation of it as a genitive tatpuruṣa is basically 
the same as the Jain commentators’ interpretations, even though 
they did not specify the sub-class of tatpuruṣa in question. Kuiji’s 
second interpretation, which understands the second component 
of the compound (jueding 決定, avyabhicārin) as having an instru-
mental case-ending, seems grammatically impossible.  
2. Kuiji’s identification of the opponent who claims the permanence 
of sound with the *Śabdotpattivādin reveals Kuiji’s systematic 
understanding of the NP as a manual for practical debate. By intro-
ducing the *Śabdotpattivādin, whose actual historical nature is 
still uncertain, as the opponent, Kuiji clearly presents a debate in 
which the two disputants present their proofs without committing 
the fallacy of anyatarāsiddha.  
3. To win a debate, it does not matter which proof is presented first, 
especially in the case of inference based on other-accepted 
grounds (gongbiliang 共比量). According to Kuiji, the winner of a 
debate is determined on the basis of “perception and scripture/‌
scripture based on perception” (xianjiao 現教). In the case of the 
two example proofs, the Vaiśeṣika’s position wins due to its reli-
ance upon what is accepted in common by the world and the 
Buddha’s teaching. On this point, Kuiji seems to misunderstand 
the destructive function of the “antinomy”, namely, its ability to 
drive the opponent into the corner of self-contradiction.  
4. Kuiji’s typology of viruddhāvyabhicārin presupposes his classifica-
tion of inference, namely, inference based on grounds one accepts 
oneself, inference based on grounds accepted by the other, and in-
ference based on commonly accepted grounds. By using this clas-
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sification system, Kuiji has constructed a new set of rules for 
debate, that is, in accordance with the type of the first proof, the 
type of the counter-proof should be restricted to one of three 
patterns. Of these, Patterns 2 and 3 can be understood as typical 
examples of viruddhāvyabhicārin being used as a method for a pra-
saṅga style of argument. 
5. Kuiji’s special interpretation of viruddhāvyabhicārin is related to 
Xuanzang’s proof of consciousness-only. According to Kuiji’s com-
mentary and other sources, Xuanzang’s proof was criticized by 
Wŏnhyo, who presented a counter-proof that leads to viruddhāvy-
abhicārin. In order to avoid this fallacy, Kuiji interprets Xuanzang’s 
proof as an inference based on commonly accepted grounds (gong-
biliang 共比量). Thus, any counter-proof must also be presented 
as a gongbiliang-inference. However, since Wŏnhyo’s inference is 
interpreted as a zibiliang-inference, his challenge is judged to be il-
legitimate in its form. 
Abbreviations 
AK/AKBh Abhidharmakośa/-bhāṣya (Pradhan, 1967) 
DhPr Dharmottarapradīpa (Malvania, 1971) 
Dōgakushō Yuishikiron dōgaku shō (唯識論同學鈔) of Ryōsan (良算), 
T2263 
HB Hetubindu (Steinkellner, 1967) 
Myōtōshō: Inmyōron so myōtō shō (因明論疏明灯抄) of Zenju (善珠), 
T2270 
NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti: see DhPr 
NBṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara: see DhPr 
NM Nyāyamukha (Yinming zhengli men lun 因明正理門論) of Dig-
nāga, T1628 
NP  Nyāyapraveśa[ka] (Jambuvijaya, 2001) 
NPV Nyāyapraveśakavṛtti of Haribhadrasūri: see NP 
NPVP Nyāyapraveśakavṛttipañjikā of Pārśvadevagaṇi: see NP 
PS/PSV 3 Pramāṇasamuccaya/-vṛtti (3rd chapter) of Dignāga (Kitagawa, 
1965) 
148 Moriyama  
 
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大蔵経 
YRZLS Yinming ru zhengli lun shu (因明入正理論疏) of Kuiji (窺基), 
T1840  
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